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ABSTRACT 
 
The issue of corporate governance has prompted calls for greater transparency and disclosure on 
companies around the world. As a result, a disclosure ranking system, Information Transparency 
and Disclosure Ranking System (ITDRS) was launched in Taiwan since 2003 by the request of 
Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC). This paper examines the relationship between 
information transparency and the informativeness of accounting earnings. The empirical tests are 
conducted using TEJ database for firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange with fiscal year ends 
between 2003 and 2004. Empirical results indicate that, information transparency, measured by the 
ranking of ITDRS, reduces the informativeness of accounting earnings. However, if information 
transparency is measured by the ratio of long-term investment in stocks, evidences show higher 
earnings response coefficients (ERC) for the more transparent firms. The results suggest that 
accounting numbers are more useful or valuable than the ITDRS ranking results from investors’ 
perspective. It also suggests that the ITDRS may be not a good proxy for financial transparency. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
fter the Asian financial crisis, information transparency and quality of disclosure of companies have 
caused much concern among members of the business community. According to the World Bank and 
Asian Wall Street Journal, publicly listed companies in South Asian countries are still grappling with 
the problem of low information transparency (World Bank, 1999; Asian Wall Street Journal, 1999). Taiwan is not an 
exception; from the latter half of 1998, the country has seen a lot of financial crises unfold; financial transparency of 
publicly listed companies has become a focus of concern among investors. Aside from being concerned about the 
converge of local accounting standards with international accounting standards, the securities market watchdog also 
made efforts to improve other disclosure environments. For example, Securities and Futures Institute (hereafter SFI), 
entrusted by the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (hereafter TSEC) has launched Information Transparency and 
Disclosure Ranking System (hereafter ITDRS) to evaluate the level of transparency for all listed companies in Taiwan 
since 2003.   
 
In this paper we examine the association between the level of information transparency and the 
informativeness of accounting earnings. We measure information transparency using both ITDRS ranking results and 
the ratio of long-term investment in stocks. Empirical results indicate that, information transparency, measured by the 
ranking of ITDRS, reduces the informativeness of accounting earnings. However, if information transparency is 
measured by the ratio of long-term investment in stocks, evidences show higher earnings response coefficients (ERC) 
for the more transparent firms. The results suggest that accounting numbers are more useful or valuable than the 
ITDRS ranking results from investors’ perspective. It also suggests that the ITDRS may be not a good proxy for 
financial transparency. 
 
In order to access the transparency and disclosure practices of listed companies, ITDRS identified 88 
disclosure items as evaluation criteria grouped into the following five categories: 
 
 
A 
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 Compliance with the mandatory disclosures 
 Timeliness of reporting 
 Disclosure of financial forecast   
 Disclosure of annual reports  
 Corporate website disclosure 
 
A two-stage of screening process was conducted by SFI. All information provided by companies was 
preliminarily screened by the SFI in-house ranking team based on the existence of each disclosure item. All 
companies were entitled to check the preliminary result via internet, then directly respond to the SFI regarding 
ambiguous issues in two weeks. Upon receiving the different opinions expressed by companies, the Ranking 
Committee, composed of experts from accounting profession, industry and academia, subsequently accessed the 
presentation and decided the final list of the more transparent companies.  
 
The level of transparency is difficult to measure. The 88 disclosure items of ITDRS are comprehensive, but 
may be not a good proxy of corporate transparency. From investors’ points of view, the least transparent item in 
financial statement is long-term investment in stocks due to the complicated pyramidal and cross-holding ownership 
structures. Since many corporate financial failures are related to insufficient disclosure of long-term stock investment, 
Chang (1999; 2002); Hsue (2002) and Yeh (2004) have pointed out that the ratio of long-term stock investment is one 
of the major concerns for investors.  
 
The higher the amount of long-term investment, the lower the financial transparency, listed companies are 
trying to reduce the ratio of long-term stock investment to convince investors that they are financially transparent. For 
example, in 2000, the UMC group merged its subsidiaries, Lien Cheng, Lien Rei, Lien Chia, and Hotai, companies 
into the parent company. Long-term investment in stocks, which was considered by the outside world as having low 
transparency, was reduced. The result not only raised the level of transparency of financial information, it also 
enhanced the company’s business performance. In another case, the Acer group carried out a series of reorganization 
in 2002. One of the goals was to change the originally complex investment structure to raise the level of business 
efficiency and make it more transparent to investors. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine the association between 
information transparency and the informativeness of accounting earnings using the ratio of long-term stock investment 
as proxy of information transparency. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the review of related 
literature. Section 3 discusses the methodology of the research, including research hypothesis, empirical model, 
sample and variables. Section 4 discusses our empirical evidence. We conclude this paper in Section 5. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Information Transparency 
 
If management owns “private” information, it will result in information asymmetry which in turn breeds 
moral hazards and adverse selection（Barnea et al. 1985). Healy and Palepu (2001) pointed out that, through financial 
report and information disclosure, companies can lower information asymmetry and agency conflicts between 
management and external investors. It is well recognized that the quality of corporate disclosure influences to a great 
extent the quality of investment decisions. Elliott and Jacobson (1994) analyze the costs and benefits of corporate 
disclosures. The potential benefits of more disclosures include lower cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1991), agency cost reduction (Leftwich et al. 1981) and improved share price (Gelb and Zarowin 2002; 
Lang and Lundholm 2000). When the information disclosure of an economic entity is adequate; it helps the investors 
and creditors in their search for investment opportunities, to pour capital into the most productive of companies. This 
in turn promotes optimum allocation of resources; consequently, aside from enhancing corporate value, information 
disclosure benefits also improves the development of the economy as a whole.  
 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) examined disclosure activity around equity offerings and its relationship to stock 
prices. They found that firms that maintain a consistent level of disclosure experience price increases prior to the 
offering. Ho and Wong (2001) also pointed out that increasing the disclosure within the annual report may reduce 
information asymmetry, improve management performance, save costs in terms of the investor’s privately produced 
information, and enhance corporate image. It satisfies the needs of the information users and achieves the goal of 
lowering the company’s investment costs. 
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The Measurement of Information Transparency 
 
How to assess and quantify transparency are very real and current difficulties. Gelb and Zarowin (2002) 
examined the association between voluntary corporate disclosure and the informativeness of stock price using the 
AIMR-FAF（Association for Investment Management Research-Financial Analysts Federation, hereafter AIMR）
annual corporate disclosure ratings. They found that greater disclosure is associated with stock prices that are more 
informative about future earnings (i.e., higher future ERC). In addition, Bens and Monahan (2004) also used the 
AIMR review results as the information disclosure level indicator to study the relationship between the level of 
information disclosure and diversity. Results show that there is a positive relationship between the disclosure quality 
assessed by AIMR and the excess value of diversification. 
 
Botosan (1997) studied the relationship of voluntary disclosure and ownership capital costs, using the 
market’s β value to estimate the ownership capital costs. The disclosure standards are assessed through the voluntarily 
disclosed items in the annual report provided. The study used content analytical method disclosure indicators, which 
are categorized into five major categories; a total of 35 disclosure items were used to assess the company’s annual 
report voluntary disclosure standards. Results indicate that: (1) in companies that attract less attention from analysts, 
there is a negative relationship between standards of disclosure and capital costs; (2) in companies that attract more 
attention from analysts, the relationship between voluntary disclosure and capital is not important. 
 
Cooke (1991) used annual reports from Japan to assess the level of voluntary disclosure and explore the 
effects of annual report voluntary disclosure standards. There were 106 voluntary disclosure items in the study; a 
corresponding standard was used to assess the level of voluntary disclosure of the company; the company’s actual 
scores were divided by the scores it should get. Results show that: (1) in Japan, company size is the major deciding 
factor of voluntary disclosure; (2) publicly listed companies and manufacturing concerns voluntarily disclose more 
information. 
 
Meek (1995) studied the factors affecting the voluntary disclosure level in the annual reports in the US, 
England, and European countries. The study results show that: (1) strategic information disclosure is affected by 
regional differences and international position. Compared to the US and Great Britain, multinationals operating in 
Europe or are publicly listed in other countries voluntarily disclose more information; (2) disclosure of non-financial 
information is affected by regional differences company sizes and industry category; and (3) level of financial 
information disclosure is affected by company size, regional differences, and industry category. In addition, 
companies which are publicly listed in other countries volunteer more information than companies which operate only 
within a single country. 
 
Ho and Wong (2001) studied the relationship between the company’s administrative structure and the scope 
of voluntary disclosure, with a focus on publicly listed Hong Kong companies. In the study, company administrative 
attributes included ratio of independent board members in the total number of people in the board of directors, the 
existence of audit committees, whether the CEO and Chairman are the same person, ratio of family members in the 
board of directors, and the stock ratio of a single family. The study’s voluntary disclosure is assessed by using the 
relative disclosure index (RDI). The study was conducted through survey; it focused on 535 financial analysts and 
screened the voluntary disclosure status of 20 assessed sample companies. Results show that the existence of the 
review commission and voluntary disclosure level has a positive relationship, while the ratio of family members in the 
board and voluntary disclosure level has a negative relationship. 
 
Yeh (2002) used the website information disclosure of Taiwan’s publicly listed companies to assess 
transparency, surveying the current status of 555 companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in terms of amount 
of company information presented on the company website. Results indicate that of the 555 companies, 89% have 
official websites; only 33% feature financial information. From this, it is evident that the websites of many companies 
usually introduce the company and its products; they disregard the information needed by investors. Consequently, it 
is necessary for local public companies to improve this aspect.   
   
Chen et al. (2005) examined factors influencing firm’s internet disclosures in terms of three dimensions: 
corporate characteristics, inside and outside ownership. They found companies with high degree of leverage, large 
number of employee and operating in the IT sector tend to disclose more information. 
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Chang and Fang (2006) studied whether the implementation of the information disclosure review system was 
able to effectively lower corporate earning management behavior. They also studied whether the results of the 
information disclosure review system were able to effectively categorize the discrepancy of the level of corporate 
earnings management. Results indicate that after the implementation of the review system, corporate earnings 
management behavior evidently went down; companies whose management had more stocks on their hands were 
more evidently affected by the system. However, there was no evident relationship between the level of transparency 
and level of earnings management. The results may be caused by the information disclosure review system and not by 
the effective assessment indicators of transparency.   
 
Informativeness Of Earnings 
 
The earnings informativeness is well documented (e.g. Beaver, Clarke and Wright 1979; Brown and Warner 
1980; Brown and Warner 1985; Collins et al 1987; Strong and Walker 1993 and others). Fan and Wong (2002) 
examine the relationship between corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in 
East Asia. We follow the research of Fan and Wong (2002) and use earnings-return relation to measure earnings 
informativeness of Taiwan’s TSEC- and OTC-listed companies. Based on the above discussion, we hypothesized a 
positive relationship between informativeness of accounting earnings and information transparency; i.e., the more 
transparent firms have greater price informativeness.   
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
 
Empirical Model 
 
This study uses the earnings-return model to examine the informativeness of accounting earnings. Company 
earnings are measured by net income; abnormal returns are measured by net-of-market returns. The abnormal returns 
of i company on t year are calculated as such:   
 
it it mtAR R R   
 
itAR  is the average abnormal return rate of the i company stock on t year; itR is the actual rate of return of 
the i company stock on t year; mtR  is the market return rate on t year.  
 
To explore the effects of level of information transparency and informativeness of accounting earnings, we 
first assess the informativeness of accounting earnings using the following regression model:  
 
0 1it it itAR a a NI      
 
where itAR  is the average abnormal return rate of the i company stock on t year; itNI  is the net income 
variable of the i company stock on the t year and 1a  is the earnings response coefficient (ERC); it  is the error 
term.  
 
The model used to examine the relationship between transparency and earnings informativeness is as 
follows:  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5it it it it it it it it it it itAR a a NI a NI TRA a NI SIZE a NI Q a NI LEV              
 
where itAR  is the average abnormal return rate of the i company on t year; itNI  is the change in the net 
income of i company on the t year; itTRA  is the dummy variable of the level of transparency of i company during 
the t year, it takes the value of 1, if transparency level is high, the others are 0; SIZE is the natural logarithm of market 
value; Q is growth opportunity (market value divided by book value); LEV is debt ratio (total debt divided by total 
assets); it  is the of error item. In this model, the earnings response coefficient of companies with lower levels of 
transparency is 1a ; the earnings response coefficient of companies with higher levels of transparency is 1a + 2a . 
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Variable Measurement and Sample Selection  
 
Measurement of Variables 
 
Following prior studies, a number of control variables are used in the regression model to control for 
potential influences on ERC (e.g. Fan and Wong 2002). The variables used include firm size, growth opportunity and 
debt ratio. The definitions of variables and their expected signs are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1:  Definition of Variables 
 
Variables Definition Expected Sign 
AR 
ΔNI 
TRA 
 
 
 
 
SIZE 
Q 
LEV 
Abnormal Return = Actual return- market return. 
Change in net income divided by lagged total assets. 
Transparency level, taking the value of 1 if selected by SFI as the more 
transparent companies and 0 otherwise; 
Or taking the value of 1 if the ratio of long-term stock investment below the 
median of all sample firms and 0 otherwise. The ratio of long-term stock 
investment is defined as long-term stock investment divided by total assets. 
Company size＝ natural logarithm of market value 
Growth opportunity = market value divided by book value 
Debt ratio = total debt divided by total assets 
 
+ 
+ 
 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
－ 
 
 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that firms with higher disclosure scores are larger than firms with lower 
scores. Collins and Kothari (1989) find that the returns of larger firms impound earnings news on a more timely basis 
than the returns of smaller firms. Size might be an important variable in determining ERC. The study of Vafeas(2000) 
pointed out that in the link between earnings and returns, the company’s size is a major decisive factor.  
 
The efficient market will be aware of the growth opportunities before they are recognized in net income and 
will bid up share price accordingly. Collins and Kothari (1989) find a positive relationship between growth 
opportunity and ERC. They use the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity as a measure of growth 
opportunities. Smith and Watts (1992) also find that there is positive relationship between diluted securities and 
company growth. When a company issues diluted securities, there is a higher growth opportunity; then the earnings 
response coefficient is also higher. This is why, high company growth opportunity implies that there is an increase in 
the company’s earnings-return ratio; investors will have a more significant reaction towards the current earnings. 
Consequently, earnings information will be reflected better on the company’s stock prices. 
 
Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) find that there is a negative relationship between earnings response coefficient 
and bond assessment and debt-equity ratio. In the study of Billing (1999), it shows that level of debt has a negative 
relationship on the earnings response coefficient; this also means that level of debt has a negative effect on the 
informativeness of earnings. 
 
Sample Selection 
 
The sample is drawn from all the TSEC and OTC listed companies in 2003 and 2004. The levels of 
information transparency come from the ranking results of ITDRS announced by the FSI. Relevant financial and 
return on stock data came from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database.  
 
Firms in financial and insurance industries are excluded from the sample because of their different firm 
characteristics. Firms with inadequate data are also deleted. The final sample consists of 841 firms in 2003 and 925 
firms in 2004; a total of 1766 firm-years from 18 industries.   
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
 Table 2 is the summary of descriptive statistics of the 1766 observations. Among these, the average of the 
abnormal return rate (AR) is -0.0961; average change in net income (ΔNI) is 0.0151. When transparency is measured 
by the ranking of ITDRS of the SFI, out of 1766 TESC-listed companies, 569 companies were selected as “the More 
Transparent Companies” (taking the value of 1); the other 1197 companies were considered not so transparent (taking 
the value of 0). With transparency level measured by ratio of long-term stock investment, 883 out of the 1766 
companies were considered as the more transparent (taking the value of 1); the other 883 companies were considered 
less transparent (taking the value of 0).    
 
 
Table 2:  Summary Of Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Year N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
AR 2003 841 -0.0041 -0.1346 0.55154 -0.96391 6.17698 
 2004 925 -0.0740 -0.1111 0.39796 -0.85443 2.19488 
 2003~4 1766 -0.0407 -0.1219 0.47843 -0.96391 6.17698 
ΔNI 2003 841 0.0196 0.0105 0.06953 -0.24924 0.59868 
 2004 925 0.0115 0.0096 0.07853 -0.47784 0.49598 
 2003~4 1766 0.0154 0.0100 0.07447 -0.47784 0.59868 
ΔNI x TRAa 2003 841 0.0062 0.0000 0.03574 -0.24565 0.36534 
 2004 925 0.0048 0.0000 0.04970 -0.47784 0.49598 
 2003~4 1766 0.0068 0.0000 0.05661 -0.35754 0.59867 
ΔNI x TRAb 2003 841 0.01052 0.00000 0.05572 -0.24565 0.59867 
 2004 925 0.00899 0.00000 0.05674 -0.35754 0.26930 
 2003~4 1766 0.00972 0.00000 0.05624 -0.35754 0.59867 
ΔNI x SIZE 2003 841 0.1534 0.0801 0.51572 -2.43521 3.60315 
 2004 925 0.0999 0.0758 0.63432 -3.69586 3.27423 
 2003~4 1766 0.1253 0.0785 0.58132 -3.69586 3.60315 
ΔNI x Q 2003 841 0.0287 0.0110 0.11507 -0.57269 1.25838 
 2004 925 0.0200 0.0108 0.13819 -1.05434 0.99707 
 2003~4 1766 0.0241 0.0109 0.12774 -1.05434 1.25838 
ΔNI*LEV 2003 841 0.0084 0.0040 0.03726 -0.10111 0.53862 
 2004 925 0.0059 0.0032 0.03395 -0.17161 0.25333 
 2003~4 1766 0.0071 0.0036 0.03557 -0.17161 0.53862 
a: Information transparency, measured by the outcomes of IDES; 569 out of 1766 samples take the value of 1 (the more 
transparent); 1197 samples take the value of 0 (the less transparent).  
b: Information transparency, measured by the ratio of long-term equity investment; 883 out of 1766 samples take the value of 1 (the 
ratio below the median, which is labeled as the more transparent); 883 samples take the value of 0 (the ratio above the median, 
which is labeled as the less transparent). 
 
 
Informativeness Of Accounting Earnings 
  
 Before analyzing the effects of financial transparency on the informativeness of accounting earnings, first, 
one needs to understand whether accounting earnings can explain the average abnormal return on stocks. In the model 
of Table 3, 1a  coefficient shows the earnings response coefficient. The empirical results of Table 3 show that, 
earnings and average abnormal return have significant positive relationship. This means that the higher the reported 
earnings, the larger the average abnormal return on company stocks.  
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Table 3:  Regression Results Of Earnings On Abnormal Return  
(Years 2003 and 2004) 
 
 
0 1it it itAR a a NI      
Variablesa Coefficient (t value) 
Intercept 
 
ΔNI 
 
-0.0867*** 
(-8.4324) 
2.9959*** 
(22.1400) 
F value 490.1783*** 
Adj R-sq 0.2175 
No. of observations 1766 
a. Definitions of variables are in Table 1. 
*** Indicates significant at the 1% level; ** Indicates significant at the 5% level; 
* Indicates significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Effect Of Information Transparency On Informativeness Of Accounting Earnings 
   
In the model of Table 4, the ERC of companies with lower levels of transparency is 1a and the ERC of 
companies with higher levels of transparency is 1a + 2a . The transparency level in column 1 of Table 4 is measured 
by the ITDRS ranking results; empirical results show that there is a negative association between transparency and the 
informativeness of accounting earnings (significant at 5% level); in this instance, companies selected as the more 
transparent have lower earnings response coefficients. The result suggests that ITDRS has serious adverse selection 
problem. In terms of control variables, the positive coefficient of the company size (ΔNI x SIZE) is consistent with the 
expected sign and has reached the significant level of 1%; the growth opportunity (ΔNI x Q) shows significant 
negative relationship which is not expected. Because high growth companies have higher risks, the growth 
opportunity (ΔNI x Q) may be affected by the company’s risks. Moreover, debt ratio (ΔNI x LEV) shows significant 
negative relationship as expected.  
 
The transparency level in column 2 of Table 4 is measured by the ratio of long-term investment in stocks; results show 
that information transparency is positively associated with the informativeness of accounting earnings (significant at 
1% level). The result supports the hypothesis that companies with higher financial transparency have higher earnings 
response coefficients. The significance level and expected sign of control variables are all the same as column 1. 
  
 Overall, after controlling other factors that may affect ERC, the empirical results shows that transparency, 
measured by ITDRS cannot increase the informativeness of earnings. On the contrary, transparency level, measured 
by the ratio of long-term stock investment can further increase the informativeness of accounting earnings. From the 
disparity comparison of the two items, this study infers that the level of financial transparency is what investors look 
out for and the ITDRS is not a good proxy to use for measuring the level of corporate transparency. In terms of 
information disclosure, majority of the companies adhere to the rule of mandatory disclosure; what the ITDRS reflects 
is merely the discrepancy of the portion voluntarily disclosed. In addition, the indicators used are too complex; it may 
be impossible to use them appropriately in all industries or individual companies. This makes the empirical results less 
reliable than expected.   
 
 On another front, the ratio of long-term stock investment can better reflect the financial transparency of the 
company because the company can carry out earnings management through a mother company/subsidiary or cross 
stock holdings. It may even achieve the goal of manipulating financial reports, resulting in information asymmetry 
between managers and investors. If the investor is a bit incautious, or unable to see the lurking danger, the result may 
be incalculable loss. Consequently, in measuring corporate transparency, investors should focus on the company’s 
ratio of long-term stock rights. We believe that companies with excessively high long-term stock rights ratio have 
lower financial transparency and lower ERC.  
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Table 4:  Regression Results Of Transparency And Control Variables On Abnormal Return 
(Years 2003 and 2004) 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5it it it it it it it it it it itAR a a NI a NI TRA a NI SIZE a NI Q a NI LEV              
 
 
 
Variablesa 
Transparency measured by the ranking of 
ITDRS  
Transparency measured by the ratio of 
long-term equity investment  
Coefficient 
(t value) 
Coefficient 
(t value) 
Intercept 
 
ΔNI  
 
ΔNI x TRA 
 
ΔNI x SIZE 
 
ΔNI x Q 
 
ΔNI x LEV 
 
-0.0864*** 
(-8.4453) 
3.4610*** 
(3.9726) 
-0.6916** 
(-2.3494) 
0.2806*** 
(2.8346) 
-0.8394*** 
(-4.5714) 
-2.6173*** 
(-3.6930) 
-0.0874*** 
(-8.5622) 
3.0880*** 
(3.5256) 
1.1033*** 
(3.9971) 
0.2738*** 
(2.8270) 
-0.9827*** 
(-5.2875) 
-3.1065*** 
(-4.3034) 
F value 107.3469*** 110.0676*** 
Adj R-sq 0.2315 0.2360 
No. of observations 1766 1766 
a. Definitions of variables are in Table 1. 
*** Indicates significant at the 1% level; ** Indicates significant at the 5% level;  
* Indicates significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 Checks Of Robustness 
 
 About one third (569 out of 1766) of companies are selected as the more transparent companies by the SFI , 
but half of the sample companies are classified as the more transparent companies by the ratio of long-term stock 
investment. To avoid any possible measurement bias, we reselect only 569 companies as the more transparent 
companies using the criterion of ratio of long-term stock investment and rerun the regression model. The results are 
virtually the same as previous reported. We also rerun the regression year by year as a sensitivity test. The results are 
not much different from the pooling sample. The above diagnostic checks have demonstrated that our empirical results 
are robust to any possible bias. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The study uses listed companies in Taiwan from 2003 and 2004 as samples to study the relations between 
information transparency and informativeness of accounting earnings. Information transparency is measured by the 
ranking results of the ITDRS of the SFI and the ratio of long-term stock investment respectively.  
 
Empirical results show that information transparency (as measured by the ratio of long-term stock investment) 
is positively associated with the informativeness of accounting earnings; this is why companies with higher financial 
transparency have higher earnings response coefficients. Adversely, when information transparency is measured by 
the ranking results of ITDRS, there is a negative association between transparency and the informativeness of 
accounting earnings; in this instance, companies selected as the more transparent have lower earnings response 
coefficients. We believe that although the indicators used by the ITDRS are comprehensive, using all the indicators as 
the common transparency level for all companies may result in the indicators to lose fidelity. Because of this, it may 
not be possible to highlight the level of transparency a company or business entity should have. On the other hand, in 
only using long-term stock investment ratio for corporate transparency has better result than that of ITDRS. It 
suggests that accounting numbers are more useful or valuable than the ITDRS ranking results from investors’ 
perspective. It also suggests that the ITDRS may be not a good proxy for financial transparency. The implication is 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – Third Quarter 2007                       Volume 23, Number 3 
 31 
that the disclosure or regulation of long-term stock investment needs to be improved in order to increase the 
transparency of listed companies and to enhance the value of accounting numbers. 
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